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IR research on medieval international society has been mixed. On the one hand, interest in 
“neo-medievalism” has led to some discussion of international relations of the medieval era. Hedley 
Bull first used the term to refer to a simultaneous trend towards cosmopolitanism as well as 
fragmentation (Bull 1977), so it is in this sense in which scholars like Ruggie (1983, for example) 
have used the term. However, much of this research has merely touched upon ​ideas​ of medieval 
international society, and not upon medieval international society itself and what it has to offer 
contemporary debates.​1 
Buzan and Little (2000) have argued against the systematic inclusion of the medieval era in 
broader historical accounts of the international system. This is because they believe that the 
medieval era was a European occurrence and, as such, was a largely “local concern” (393). Their 
point is well taken if one is interested in establishing a more encompassing account of the 
international system. However, given the European character of both the concept of international 
society, as well as the interest in “neo-medievalism” particularly in Europe,​2​ I argue that it is worth 
considering the broader effects on medieval international society. 
Yet there are many scholars who would question the value of doing yet more work on 
European history, a topic well covered by historians. Indeed, one of the reasons why Buzan and 
Little call the medieval era a local occurrence is that to assume it has greater significance borders on 
Eurocentrism. Eurocentrism –or more broadly, Western-centric--research is a problem in IR (and in 
many fields). But the problem has a more complex answer than just conducting more research on 
non-Western international relations. Eurocentrism perpetuates not just a geographical fixation on 
Europe, but also a range of conventional accounts about Europe. The “Westphalian myth,” which is 
frequently referred to by IR scholars, indicates one such account: it is a story about the legitimacy of 
the territorially-bounded nation-state which possesses uncontested, absolute sovereignty. And such 
conventional accounts are sometimes no more helpful for Europe than they are for anyone else. 
With this in mind, I argue that there are good reasons to begin accounts of modern IR with 
the medieval era precisely ​because ​it was a local occurrence. It was crucial to defining what was 
“European”; further, its version of what universality consisted of had later far-reaching effects upon 
international society. In Buzan and Little’s study, they include a category of pre-international 
systems; while their interest is in international systems, they include the pre-international category 
because these systems persisted well into the time during which international systems began 
developing, thus they continued to have effects (388). Like Buzan and Little’s pre-international 
systems, medieval international society continued, and I would add continues, to have lasting effects 
on contemporary institutions. 
Keeping in mind the lasting effects of medieval international society, and motivated by the 
limitations of conventional accounts about Europe, this chapter focuses on the contributions of 
medieval international society to contemporary debates regarding institutional forms and legitimacy. 
Here, I will be particularly concerned with the types of units within medieval international society, 
and how they are embedded in the structure of society. 
Historians of the medieval era typically refer to three broad social structures, the Church, the 
universities and “secular” structures (the cities, the princes and the Holy Roman Empire), into which 
the major actors of the era belong. Adda Bozeman simplifies this typology to the papacy, the 
university and the Empire, calling them the three great European powers. She argues that they each 
contributed different ideational resources, while simultaneously claiming a universal 
constituency—and many times the same one (Bozeman 1994, 434). It should be noted, however, 
that just because these structures claimed they were universal did not mean they were equal. On the 
contrary, in most cases, only one could exercise authority at a time—but who would exercise 
authority was always a question. 
Bozeman gives us a good starting point, especially by drawing our attention the overlapping 
“universes” of the major actors of medieval international society. In using the term “universes” this 
way, I refer to Donnelly’s recent deployment of the term in his discussion of the relative universality 
of human rights; he argues that we can distinguish between “ontological” and “functional” 
universality.​3​ Ontological claims argue that universality is based on “objectively” held values which 
define the terms of the debate, while functional universality is the pragmatic expression of, and 
reasoning for, shared norms. Functional universality is based on “overlapping consensus,” which in 
this way provides multiple grounds for the shared norms in question (Donnelly 2007, 293). 
Donnelly also adds that functional universalities may be seen as “imperfection reflections of 
a deeper ontological universality” (293). He would most likely argue that, for this reason, the more 
interesting question is about the nature of the overlapping consensus of functional universality; I 
concur that this is an important question, but there is another interesting point about ontological 
universality which we should consider. In his discussion, he assumes irreconcilable differences 
regarding the nature of ontological universality. This is because he is discussing contemporary 
human rights, in which consensus regarding ontological universality cannot be expected. Some 
societies may believe that the justification for human rights lies in something “God-given,” while 
others will necessarily argue against this. But at least in the case of medieval international society, the 
story is a little bit different: among actors of medieval international society, there was ontological 
universality, in the sense that society believed it existed because of a divine plan.​4​ What was ​not 
universal, however, was a consensus about the form in which that ontological universality should be 
expressed. This lack of consensus then may be described as a limited and overlapping consensus. 
Another way of describing the difference between medieval international society and contemporary 
human rights (besides the obvious empirical differences) is the following: in the latter case we must 
ask what underlies the overlapping consensus (what is the groundwork for an overlapping consensus 
regarding human rights)? But in the former case there are distinct underlying principles, while there 
was considerable controversy regarding how to express them. 
This paper will focus on the nature of overlapping consensus within medieval international 
society, in particular the question: how did the differing actors of medieval international society, 
drawing on similar notions of ontological universality, have an overlapping consensus regarding 
institutional practices at the time? And further, what were the limits of this consensus? It should be 
noted that I do not discuss the character of “ontological universality” here, since the subject of the 
previous chapter was the contested nature of principles and practices of medieval international 
society. Here, that ontological universality stands as a backdrop to a central discussion of 
overlapping consensus instead. 
Medieval international society consisted of a diversity of functionally differentiated actors 
which were largely unequal. Within modern international relations, realist scholars argue that the 
equality of actors is a consequence of their similarity, and equal actors are designated with equivalent 
rights and obligations in international society. On one hand, within medieval international society, 
the logical opposite of the previous statement about modern IR follows: functionally differentiated 
actors are not equals. However, actors of medieval international society often called upon the same 
foundations to justify their authority. Therefore, if these actors were unequal, this was both an 
empirical question and we only know this to be the case retrospectively – because one actor 
prevailed over the other. In other words, while some actors were clearly subordinate to others in 
medieval international society, others were not so clearly defined. Actors had to struggle –in 
generally agreed upon ways—to determine who would be the authority in a given situation. 
In practice, anarchy and hierarchy were both important in medieval international society.​5 
This is because several different hierarchies were in operation, and there was no clear overarching 
authority over all of them. The hierarchy which existed in the Holy Roman Empire did not translate 
into the terms of the Church’s hierarchy. Similarly, the hierarchies of cities and principalities were 
not subsumed under the Church or the Empire. The same can be said of the universities. Yet, when 
cities related to one another they were closer to equals, just as clergy could relate to one another as 
more or less equals. However, these kinds of relations were infrequent – more often than not, 
different kinds of actors had to find ways to relate to one another, and to answer the question which 
always arose – whose authority would predominate (meaning, which hierarchy would prevail)? 
In the following discussion, I focus on two peace settlements, the Council of Constance and 
the Peace of Augsburg as sources for the consideration of actors of medieval international society. It 
is my aim here to discuss the actors as a means of getting at the institutions of international society. 
To move towards identifying institutions, I suggest a couple of analytical methods here: first, I seek 
to make sense of both the competing “universes” of medieval international society, as well as the 
various ordering principles at work in those universes, both anarchy and hierarchy and autarchy and 
heterarchy. I use Bozeman’s three structures as a starting point for getting at actors of international 
society. Nonetheless, the challenge is that each of these “structures” is arguably an institution, and I 
have said that my goal here is to limit the discussion to actors before institutions. 
I limit the discussion in two ways. First, Daniell Philpott’s focus on membership within 
international society is useful. He asks three questions, in essence: who are the actors?; How do they 
get to be members?; And what are their rights, privileges and perhaps obligations in international 
society? (Philpott 2001). Depending on how one looks at these questions, one can either focus on 
the units of international society or the rules shared between them. The first question asks us to 
consider how much the members of the society contribute to the constitution of the society. The 
second question, “How do they get to be members?” asks about the shared processes among units 
which are deemed legitimate participation. Finally, the third question asks how rights and obligations 
are associated with members. Do different sorts of members have different privileges? 
Second, I then discuss each of the “universes” as sectors of international society (Buzan and 
Little 2000), and then discuss how each of these sectors operated according to different rules; 
because sectors of analysis identify relations in a given issue area (B and L, 72), this allows me to 
focus on the sets of actors associated with the Church, the Empire and universities. But 
simultaneously, these sectors also overlapped; thus, after the section on sectors, I consider ordering 
principles explicitly. I discuss the coexisting and (perhaps) competing elements of anarchy, hierarchy, 
autarchy and heterarchy in medieval international society. 
 
The Council of Constance 
The Council of Constance’s main objective was to end the Great Schism of 1378, otherwise 
known as the Great Western Schism. Historians distinguish between two major schisms: a western 
one and an eastern one. The latter took place over a period of several centuries, with the controversy 
centering on (in very simplified terms) where the Holy See should be located. According to the 
conventional wisdom, the major consequence of the Great Eastern Schism was the split between the 
Catholic and Orthodox Churches.​6​ However, the former, which the Council of Constance aimed to 
resolve, took place in Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The source of the Great 
Western Schism was the presence of at first two, and then three, claimants to the papacy (539). 
However, the ​Catholic Encyclopedia ​argues that the Great Western Schism was “not a schism 
properly so called, being in reality a deplorable misunderstanding concerning a question of fact” 
(Forget , 540). As the same article in ​The Catholic Encyclopedia ​suggests​, ​a schism is the complete 
“rupture of ecclesiastical unity” such that the Church exists in state of disassociation from its body, 
the “mystical body of Christ” (529). To suggest that the Great Western Schism was not a schism, as 
some church historians do, is to focus on the ultimate outcome of the Council of Constance, the 
reinstatement of the papacy, as an outcome that was somehow inevitable. Historical evidence tells us 
that that this outcome was not clear, however. 
Further, considering the Council of Constance with international politics in mind allows an analyst 
to understand how the Council contributed new models of political organization. I argue that in the 
long run, the Council made significant contributions to medieval international society, which it could 
not have done if had been nothing more than a minor misunderstanding about church politics. 
Historians of the Council of Constance usually divide their accounts based on the items on 
the Council’s agenda: the resolution of the Great Western Schism, the reform of the Curia Romana 
(the administrative arm of the Church), including both the taxation system and the organization of 
offices, and addressing the increasing problems of heresy. In keeping with this consensus, I will first 
discuss the resolution of the Schism, and then address the questions of reform and heresy. 
 
The Resolution of the Schism 
Attempts were made to resolve the Schism at an earlier church council, held just five years 
before the Council of Constance. I therefore begin my account with this earlier council, the Council 
of Pisa (1409). In many ways, Pisa had similarities to Constance, in both its organization and its 
objectives. Further, and I will return to this idea later, some representatives at the early sessions of 
the Council of Constance wanted their meetings to be considered a continuation of the Council of 
Pisa, rather than an entirely new council. 
In 1380, officials at the University of Paris suggested to the French king that the only way 
out of the schism would be a general council. But the matter was controversial.​ ​There was 
continuous discussion among theologians, lawyers and royal councilors about the rights and duties 
of the actors involved in ending the schism. They asked questions such as, what were the rights and 
duties of subjects to take control when rulers were incapable or unwilling?; what were the 
rights/duties of bishops vis-à-vis the pope?; what were the rights and duties of the learned as experts 
on the law?; what were the rights and duties of the clergy vs. the laity? (Hughes 1960, 230). 
Discussion of this nature, between many different types of actors, was not unusual. Bozeman 
describes fifteenth century Europe as “a composite of secular and ecclesiastical interests, territorial 
and extra-territorial associations, and national and international powers” (Bozeman, 500). 
However, before the Council of Pisa, it was not the general practice of the ​congregatio fidelium 
(loosely translated, “congress of the faithful,” the term used to describe the Church universal) to use 
general councils in the absence of the pope’s authority. This, however, was precisely the challenge: 
with several claimants to the papacy, how was ecclesiastical life to be reformed? But more urgently, 
how was the Christian community to decide which pope was the legitimate pope? Indeed, did the 
Christian community—or the ​congregatio fidelium—​have the authority to make such a decision? 
Conversely, in the absence of the papacy, where else could authority for the maintenance and 
constitution of ecclesiastical life derive from, if not from a general council? 
In 1408, the rival colleges of cardinals deserted their popes and came together in order to 
issue a joint summons to meet in Pisa in March 1409.​7​ This fact, that the cardinals and not the pope 
called the council, was the first reason that Pisa was unique as a council. The second reason was how 
it operated. For the first time, a diversity of secular actors (e.g. representatives from universities, 
princes’ ambassadors) and not only bishops, could vote. In Hughes’s words, “The General Council 
had indeed a new look. It greatly resembled a parliament” (Hughes, 231).​8​ At Pisa, the Council 
deposed the two rival popes and elected a new pope, John XXIII,​9​ with the hope that he would be 
recognized as legitimate. The Council also issued a decree that bound John XXIII to call another 
council in 1412 (Hughes, 231). The delegation at Pisa hoped that, as its sessions drew to a close, that 
the Schism would be resolved. In requiring John XXIII to call another council in 1412, they sought 
to reinforce the new pope’s authority. However, it became increasingly clear that the Curia Romana 
(the church hierarchy) was not prepared to accept the new pope as legitimate. 
As required by the decree, John XXIII did call this council in 1412, but almost no one came 
and he quickly disbanded the council. It was becoming clear to Christendom that the pope was not 
the reformer that they had understood him to be at his election at Pisa; thus, with his reputation in 
decline, he fled to Florence. It was only with Emperor Sigismund’s advice that he then called for 
another council in 1413, the Council of Constance (Hughes, 232). The need for another council was 
increasing because John XXIII’s authority was not being recognized as legitimate. The rival popes 
remained in the background and the Christian community remained dissatisfied with the papacy’s 
taxation system. Further, the Curia Romana was engaged in increasing controversy surrounding 
questions of heresy (Shahan 1908, 288-294). The Council of Constance was therefore again faced 
with a decision regarding what to do about the rival popes. This problem, combined with significant 
dissatisfaction with the Curia Romana, meant that the papacy itself came into question. 
However, before the Council could do anything, it had to address two challenges: first, how 
would the Council be defined? The controversy centered upon whether Constance would be 
considered a continuation of the Council of Pisa, or whether it would be a new council. In the 
former scenario, John XXIII would have been considered the legitimate authority, and the council 
would have been able to address the more procedural matters of heresy and taxation. Yet, the 
representatives of the council lacked the consensus necessary to proceed in this continuous fashion 
(Schroeder 1937, 444). Instead, the Council of Constance became a new council, with its first task to 
depose the rival popes and elect a legitimate one before it could address the issues of heresy and 
taxation. 
Following questions of definition, the representatives at the Council addressed questions of 
organization. Similar to Pisa, at Constance there were numerous secular representatives (Schroeder, 
443-444);​10​ though in addition, Constance was organized by nations as the University of Paris was 
organized. The nations were first the Italians, French and Germans; later the English and the 
Spanish joined. Each nation would have one vote, and they would decide how to vote in national 
preliminary meetings. All the various types of actors (bishops, abbots, proctors of absentee prelates, 
lawyers, university representatives, doctors of theology, etc.) would have a say in these preliminary 
meetings (Hughes, 232; Shahan, 288). Changing the rules of participation of the general council such 
that nations could vote was significant enough, but even more significantly, the general council took 
away the cardinals’ separate vote. After May 1415, only the nations could vote (Shahan, 288). 
These first two challenges, regarding the definition and structure of the Council, affected 
when and if the members of the Council could address the resolution of the Schism and the reform 
agenda. In the first four sessions of the delegates’ decision to start a new council rather than 
continuing the Council of Pisa had implications for the council’s agenda because starting a new 
council, particularly one called by the emperor and not the pope, signaled recognition of the Schism. 
Had they simply added sessions onto to the Council of Pisa, they could have – at least in 
theory—proceeded with reform much sooner. 
The Italian majority, in particular, clung to the idea of continuing Pisa. But with the 
introduction of voting rights for the nations, the power of the Italian delegation was undermined. 
The introduction of voting rights for non-religious representatives therefore had an effect on both 
the definition and structure of the Council: the Council would be a new Council, whose voting 
members consisted of a variety of actors. This, in turn, meant that the Council would seek to 
address far more than small reforms. 
This point is illustrated by the nations’ first decision within the Council: because the nations 
argued for papal resignations, after the Italian majority was undermined, the rival popes had little 
choice but to resign (Schroeder, 444). This decision not only reinforced the nations’ importance 
within the Council, but it also reminded the ​congregatio fidelium ​that the Council was by default, in the 
absence of the papacy, the supreme authority (Hughes, 233). As the vacancy of the Holy See ensued, 
the Council made this default position formal; it declared its supremacy over the papacy with the 
Sacrosancta ​decree (Schroeder, 445-446). 
Sacrosancta ​was necessary so that the Council could, at the very least, make the decisions 
necessary to repair the papacy so that ecclesiastical life could be maintained. By issuing this decree, it 
ensured that the Council would continue to have a say in the resolution of the Schism and then the 
reform agenda that would follow. In the first instance, this meant having a say in the appointment of 
a new pope. After the deposition of the rival popes, the Council then decided that there should be a 
commission to determine how the pope should be elected, and that in these exceptional 
circumstances—that is, with the pressing need to end the Great Schism—the nations would, just 
this once, have a say in electing the new pope (Hughes, 237). 
However, the matter regarding the election of a new pope was highly controversial. There 
were significant differences between the nations: the Spanish, French and Italians wanted an 
immediate election, arguing that the lack of papal authority was a source of anarchy within the 
community, while the English and Germans believed that reforms would be forgotten if a new pope 
was elected immediately. Eventually, the nations came to a compromise position, calling for an 
immediate election of a new pope, but specifying that the new pope must ​immediately ​take up the 
reform issues identified by the Council (Schroeder, 447). 
To ensure that this would occur, the Council issued the decree ​Frequens, ​the practical 
corollary to ​Sacrosancta. Frequens ​made general councils required; the pope would be bound to call 
another council 5 years and 7 years after Constance, after which he would be required to call for a 
council at least every 10 years. In this way, because a council would either always be happening or 
always be in mind, there was an increased likelihood of keeping reform issues prominent (Hughes, 
236). However, the Council did make compromises; with ​Frequens, ​the council agreed to be 
concerned only with reforms that were needed for the whole church; any other concerns would be 
dealt with separately between the pope and the nations (Hughes, 236; Jedin 1960, 122; Schroeder, 
443-445).​11​ The council was again subject to the authority of the papacy. 
After the election of the new pope, Martin V, the Council was recognized as “ecumenical,” meaning 
that the Curia Romana recognized it as universally legitimate, and therefore its decisions were 
binding upon the entirety of the ​res publica Christiana ​(Jedin, 3, 12-13)​. ​It was only after this that the 
Council began to address the reform agenda and the resolution of heresy, so it is here that I will shift 
to a discussion of this agenda. 
 
The Reform Agenda and the Resolution of Heresy 
After the election of the new pope, the Council was able to pick up the questions associated 
with the reform of ecclesiastical life. There were three issues on the reform agenda. First was the 
general dissatisfaction with the papacy’s interference in the appointment of church offices, and 
second was the centralized taxation system that the papacy had been using to fund the 
administration of the Church (Loomis 1961, 29). Finally, the Church agreed to address the problems 
of heresy as well, which they believed were threatening the basic fabric of the ​congregatio fidelium. 
Although it is not standard to discuss how the Council addressed heresy as part of the broader 
reform agenda, here I do so because the issues raised by the reform agenda and by the main heretic 
tried at the Council, John Hus, were closely related. In one way, Hus was not unusual for his 
objections, given that taxation of local churches for papal activities had long been unpopular 
(Tierney 1964, 160). By trying John Hus, the now ecumenical council was able to justify its minor 
policy reforms. 
Outcomes from the Council’s reform agenda were not particularly substantial. Included 
among them were changes to the rules regarding the appointment of Church officeholders and 
regarding benefices and tithes for the same officeholders. Some historians have argued that the 
reason the Council of Constance failed to address items on the reform agenda was because of 
conflicts between the nations (Loomis, 12). The discussion in the previous section, regarding the 
conflict between the nations which prevented them from getting to the reform agenda before the 
pope was elected, provides some evidence for this view. Discussions regarding the election of the 
now pope and reform were interwoven with one another; for example, some of the nations wanted 
to address reform earlier in the Council’s sessions because they were afraid that after the pope was 
elected, he would take the Council’s suggestions less seriously. 
In a way, this is what happened. Beside the minor reform outcomes mentioned above which 
applied to the entirety of the community, the other notable outcome was the set of concordats 
agreed between the Curia Romana and the nations. Concordats were specific agreements between 
the papacy and local churches (they could not yet be considered “national” churches) which 
included rules for the appointment of local church offices as well as taking away church officials’ 
privileges to only be tried in ecclesiastical courts (Jedin, 122).​12​ Arguably, the fact that many of the 
reforms were handled locally did contribute to disrupting some of the Council’s consensus (what 
was left of it by the time Martin V was elected). 
After addressing the issues of taxation and benefices, the Council of Constance addressed heresy in 
two ways. First, they sentenced to death John Hus, a leader of the Czech Reform movement; 
second, they had Wyclif’s writings destroyed and his remains burned. The latter followed the former, 
and was related, since Hus was a follower of Wyclif, and in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries 
anyone believed to be a follower of Wyclif risked excommunication at best, and trial by death at 
worst. 
Hus argued for an expanded role for the laity in the day-to-day life of the Church. He focused 
particularly on the role of God’s grace, the importance of apostolic emulation and the central place 
of scriptural teachings. For Hus, practical examples of these emphases included lay people preaching 
and receiving Communion in addition to clergy, and considering critically whether church 
officeholders were living up to their positions (so, for example cardinals were not necessarily heirs to 
Christ’s apostles simply because of their positions; they had to earn that status and maintain it 
through an apostolic life) . 
These views made Hus threatening to the Curia Romana because he was challenging the idea that 
their positions in the Church hierarchy were uncontested. For example, one of Hus’s opponents at 
the Council distinguished between the Catholic and Apostolic Churches, with the Catholic Church 
being “the Greeks, Latins and barbarians who believe in Christ,” and which can never err because it 
is where salvation is found; the Apostolic Church, on the other hand, was “a particular Church and, 
as such, is included in the Church Catholic. It comprises the pope, the cardinals, the bishops and the 
lay members. It is commonly called the Roman Church” (Spinka 1965, 20-21). Thus, holders of 
church offices argued that they held these positions because of apostolic succession. While on the 
one hand this argument meant that the Apostolic Church was a particular church, it also meant that 
it was the ​only​ acceptable particular expression of the broader Catholic Church. 
But Hus was suggesting a different interpretation of the Apostolic Church, one which included the 
entire community of the faithful. According to his view then, the Apostolic and Catholic Churches 
should not and could not be separated. Hus’s reasoning for this conclusion came from philosophical 
realism, the same tradition which Wyclif was a part of. Philosophical realists argued for the 
separation of the universal and the particular, which made room for the particular to be contingent 
upon different historical circumstances. For the more traditional members of the Council who 
wanted to see the papacy restored, this was problematic because if one made the particular primary, 
this could threaten the universal foundations of the society. One scholar explains the implications of 
this view in the following manner: 
The real thing in man must … be the humanity which is shared alike by Socrates, by Plato, 
and by every other individual man: individuality thus belongs merely to the phenomenal 
world, to the seeming and the transitory. What, then, … becomes of the immortality of the 
soul? One step more and the personality of God disappears with the personality of man 
(Rashdall 1895, 45-46). 
 
The irony is that Hus used his philosophical realism to arrive at an orthodox position. He was not 
arguing for increased secular power, which was ultimately one of the results of the Council of 
Constance, but rather he was arguing for a revitalized Church universal—one that would take the 
Curia Romana back to its foundations (or so he believed) of Scriptural teachings. In essence then, 
although he was charged for specific offenses at the Council of Constance, what I am suggesting is 
that Hus was considered heretical because of his methodology for his arguments, less than his actual 
theological positions (Rashdall, 55, 57).​13 
However, we still need to know what Hus’s specific offenses were. There were four main ones: 1) 
his Wyclifism was public knowledge because he taught Wyclif’s thought; 2) members of the Council 
accused Hus of opposing the orthodox doctrine of transubstantiation; 3) he publicly refused to 
show papal obedience when he accepted the position of rector at the University of Prague, a 
position granted to him by the Czech king who had decided to support the Council of Pisa; 4) 
finally, he criticized two papal bulls on indulgences. 
Hus’s teachings were first challenged while he was the dean of the faculty of arts and simultaneously 
pursuing his doctorate of theology. It was during this time that he publicly began teaching and 
defending Wyclif’s positions in his lectures. Hus was not alone in teaching Wyclif’s thought, 
particularly among some of the other Czech masters, who were gradually starting to be called the 
Czech reform movement. However, teaching Wyclif’s thought came with risks; while Hus was 
teaching, there was a commission regarding a German master’s Wyclifism. As a result of the 
commission, church officials took a harder line on the doctrine of transubstantiation in the 
following manner: after the words of consecration, nothing remains in the sacrament except the 
body and blood of Christ; the commission even forbade the use of the word bread. Hus criticized 
this outcome, arguing the orthodox view of transubstantiation instead. This position was later held 
against him at Constance; members of the Council claimed he was preaching remanence . 
Here, the Council’s problem with Hus again went back to his philosophical realism. Again, Hus was 
splitting the particular and the universal—this time in the sacrament of the Eucharist. 
“Remanence”—also referred to sometimes as “consubstantiation”-- meant that while the bread and 
wine transformed, they also simultaneously remained bread and wine. In other words, their material 
properties remained but were nothing more than temporal accidents (Rubin 1991, 326). Another 
way to draw this distinction is the following: the orthodox position argued that transubstantiation 
demonstrated the ​real ​presence of Christ in the Eucharist. Hus did not take issue with the ​real 
presence of Christ, but rather added that the bread and wine were still bread and wine, in addition to 
the spiritual qualities they took on. But for members of the Council, Hus’s position emphasized the 
accidence of the bread and the wine too much – so much so that using the word “bread” was 
problematic. 
Hus also disagreed regarding papal obedience. When the Council of Pisa was called, at the urging of 
the French king and the University of Paris, the French sent a delegation to obtain support from the 
Czech king, who agreed to support the Council. However, the German university masters remained 
faithful to Gregory XII. As punishment, the king reorganized the University of Prague so that the 
Czech nation would have more votes and the foreign nations more (a reversal of the previous 
organization). He then made Hus the first rector of the reorganized university. Hus was therefore in 
a highly public position that revealed his support of the conciliar movement. In response, the 
German masters signed an oath saying they would not abide by the changes and fled to form the 
University of Leipzig . Later, members of the German nation at the Council of Constance were 
especially stringent regarding the charges of heresy held against Hus. 
Finally, in 1412, he openly criticized two papal bulls on indulgences. John XXIII issued a bull 
condemning King Ladislas of Naples as a schismatic and a heretic, requiring his excommunication; 
further, the bull stated that all who supported the effort would be granted indulgences. In two 
different treatises, Hus criticized this act, particularly the selling of indulgences without the usual 
requirements of repentance; only God forgives sins, he argued . Thus, before the Council of 
Constance even began, Hus had charges of heresy stacked up against him. 
Even if Hus was orthodox, and the motivation for trying him was based more on his philosophical 
realism, what is striking is that many of the practices associated with Hus’s offenses again arose at 
the Peace of Ausgburg. Admittedly, in one way this is not striking; with over a hundred years 
between the two congresses, there was ample time for these practices to make inroads in 
international society. However, what is striking is that the controversy at Augsburg centered around 
problems with the practices themselves, rather than the arguably more fundamental questions raised 
by Hus’s trial at Constance. Specifically, questions about the role of the laity and indulgences were 
discussed at Augsburg—but notably, the issue of papal obedience, which was so critical at 
Constance, was not on the agenda. 
 
The Peace of Augsburg 
 
Circumstances were quite different in 1555 at Augsburg. While at Constance, the ​res publica Christiana 
could be understood as “headless,” this was not the case at Augsburg. No one was specifically 
challenging the existence of the papal office, though the congress itself challenged papal legitimacy 
simply because it occurred. Further, decisions taken at the congress contributed to chipping away 
more of papal authority, as well as the overall integrity of the ​congregatio fidelium. ​The Peace of 
Augsburg was called by the emperor, Charles V, since the pope would not call for a general council. 
Thus, it is also referred to as the Augsburg Diet, as it was a meeting of the Holy Roman Empire. 
Because the Peace of Augsburg was not an official church council, and the law of nations was not 
legitimated enough to provide a basis for its recognition, historians often consider the Peace to be a 
“German” occurrence.​14​ This is problematic though, given that the Holy Roman Empire and the 
later German nation-state are not one and the same. Also, the Peace dealt with specifically Lutheran 
differences with the Church; therefore, to call the Peace “German” is to assume that “Lutheran” 
means “German”—which it did not necessarily. At the time of the Peace of Augsburg, the Holy 
Roman Empire had the potential to influence much of the ​res publica Christiana. ​Historical evidence 
tells us that it did in fact do so, as some of the later local changes in response to the need to address 
issues of religious governance demonstrate. 
All this is not to suggest that the Holy Roman Empire and the outcomes of the Peace of Augsburg 
were not limited. They were. The fact that the Peace was a Diet and not a Church council 
contributed to this; also, the fact that the Peace was specifically “Lutheran” contributed to this. But 
these limits were precisely what contributed to changes in institutions at the time. 
Additionally, understanding the Peace of Augsburg as particularly German overlooks the broader, 
European outcomes of the Peace. Rather, the Peace of Augsburg had significant “spillover effects.” 
 
Like the Council of Constance, the Peace of Augsburg (1555) sought to reunify Christendom. The 
preface to the Peace called for a “permanent” religious peace. Although its outcomes were not 
permanent, this goal nevertheless pervaded negotiations. 
The Peace took place in the middle of the period contemporary scholars now call the 
Reformation, so the Church’s internal cohesion – both the Curia Romana and the congregatio 
fidelium – was challenged. The Czech Reform movement had turned into a movement of 
“Hussites,” which the Curia Romana was consistently trying to undermine. Further, by the time of 
the Peace of Augsburg, Luther had already publicly declared his differences with the Church 
hierarchy. 
These growing divisions within international society were placing the pope under increasing pressure 
to call a general council to address the sources of controversy. However, the pope wanted to avoid 
discussion of religious divisions within Christendom, not least because calling a council would 
demonstrate that he was incapable of exercising his authority to solve the crisis (Spitz, 1956). The 
Peace of Augsburg was therefore partially a response to the absence of a general council. Initially, 
Charles V did not want to call for the Diet of the Holy Roman Empire to convene regarding these 
matters, since such an action would undermine the pope’s authority. Yet, he ultimately decided that 
some kind of response was required, and called for the Diet in order to reunify Christendom. Before 
proceeding, he gave the pope the opportunity to support his decision. The pope did not take the 
opportunity. 
But the Peace of Augsburg could not happen immediately. Before the Diet could meet and 
draft policies to address the problems associated with religious differences, they had to establish 
clearly what those differences were. Thus, in 1530, the emperor called for the Augsburg Confession 
(hereafter referred to as either “the Confession” or “CA,” the acronym for its Latin name, 
“Confessio Augustana”). The Confession defined the major points of agreement and contention 
between Luther’s followers and Catholicism, or the “old” and “new” believers, as they were 
frequently referred to. 
It is essential to begin with the CA since the Peace that followed only applied to the parties 
to the Confession. The Confession was divided into two different parts: the first part sought to 
demonstrate the points of agreement between the “new” and “old” believers, while the second part 
outlined the areas of doctrinal controversy. This format was important because it shows how Luther 
and his followers​15​ were indicating their endorsement of the emperor’s goal to reunify Christendom; 
they sought first to show how their religious practices were not in conflict with the Church . 
The points of agreement found in the first part of the CA followed similar lines to Luther’s 
private confession in 1528. In brief terms, Luther argued against the notion of good works as a 
means to salvation. Rather, according to his confession, salvation could only be achieved through 
faith alone in Christ. Thus, according to Luther, good works are not what one does as a means to an 
end (e.g., salvation), but what one must do out of obedience to God . Luther also addressed the 
practices of monasticism and indulgences in a similar manner: just as doing good works as a means 
to an end was problematic, Luther argued that a monastic life, if done for the wrong reasons was no 
guarantee of salvation; further, the idea of indulgences, which could be purchased upon completion 
of good works, was objectionable to him. 
It is important to note that while the positions expressed in the first part of the CA, 
regarding good works and indulgences, were unpopular with the Church hierarchy, they were not 
radical departures towards a new faith, but rather a return to a traditional understanding of the 
Church . Like Hus before him, Luther was also quite orthodox in his positions. It is for this reason 
that Smith has argued that the CA had a “catholicizing tendency” because it attempted to show that 
“in the Lutheran doctrine [there was] ‘nothing repugnant to Scripture or to the Catholic church or to 
the Roman church” (97). 
The second part of the CA included the areas of doctrinal controversy. These are known as 
the “disputed articles,” and the most well known of these was CA 28, which outlined which 
elements of the medieval hierarchy would remain, and which would be modified. These were: 1) 
bishops would no longer require vows of celibacy; 2) evangelical doctrine would not be permitted at 
ordination; 3) the pope was required to give space for interpretation of the gospel. What this meant 
was that, absent of the pope’s authority (and correspondingly, canon and imperial law), questions of 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction went to others . 
Ultimately, the entirety of the CA described the specific differences between the Catholic 
and Lutheran faiths. The doctrinal differences between Luther and other Reformation leaders, such 
as Zwingli and Calvin, were never addressed in the CA. Only once, at a preliminary meeting before 
the Confession actually began, did Landgrave Philip of Hesse call a meeting between Zwingli, 
Luther and their followers in order to establish points of agreement between the two groups. They 
drafted the Marburg Articles at this meeting, but these were largely excluded from the final 
documentation within the Confession (called the Schwabach Articles).​16​ Nonetheless, some princes 
at the CA –for example, the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg—rejected the Schwabach Articles 
because it was not in their interest to alienate the Swiss (Grane 1959, 15). 
Because the Confession only applied to Lutherans, the Peace that followed also only applied 
to Lutherans. Yet, this was only a legal sense; the CA had some spillover effects. Lutheranism was 
considered a ​religio licita ​(legal religion), a status which granted what became other strands of 
Protestantism greater normative authority, even if they were not formally recognized. For example, 
after the Peace of Augsburg the pope could no longer excommunicate people just because they were 
Protestant, a fact which Elizabeth I took advantage of. When she finally was excommunicated in 
1570, it was not because she was Protestant, but because she was ​specifically ​Calvinist, and Calvinist 
ideas were beyond the conditions of the Peace . 
Further, the central questions of the Peace of Augsburg—how to clearly delineate the terms of 
religious governance and how to describe the limits of imperial law—confirm the spillover effects of 
the CA. Grane refers to the “double-mindedness” of the CA, meaning that it had both theological 
and political objectives. At the CA, matters of theological controversy were worked out ​because ​these 
issues also brought up a legal conflict (Grane, 19). So at the Peace of Augsburg, those present at 
looked back on the terms of the CA to set limits and draft policies. Specifically, the official position 
at the Peace was that the terms of the Schwabach Articles must be adhered to; as long as they were, 
princes could be seen as acting under the auspices of imperial authority (Grane, 16, 17). 
The Diet for the Peace of Augsburg was called for the 13​th​ of November, 1554, but it did not 
commence until the 5​th​ of February. It took this long for all the Estates to gather, although by Feb. 
5​th​, only two ecclesiastical princes were present, the Cardinal Bishop of Augsburg and Bishop of 
Eichstadt . This long delay in beginning the negotiations was largely to do with differences regarding 
the objectives of the Peace. 
Neither the Catholics nor the Protestants at the Peace voted as a bloc. Among both groups, there 
was a wide range of views regarding how the congress should proceed. In the case of the Catholics, 
although they generally agreed with the Emperor’s goal to restore unity to the ​res publica Christiana​, 
with a few minor “concessions … in the case of dire necessity,” there were some who clung firmly 
to the old notion of the Church as one unified faith community (Tüchle, 149; Spitz, 111-112). 
Among the Protestants, views ranged from those who wanted religious issues formally removed 
from discussions at the Diet, to those believed princes should see it as an obligation to establish an 
evangelical, territorial church (Spitz, 113). 
The Elector of Saxony, who was coming from a region which was primarily Protestant, argued that 
religious issues should be formally removed from the agenda because he thought that agreement on 
the issues was next to impossible. According to his view, a lasting peace could only occur in the 
absence of discussion over religious issues. His position was not popular though; for example, the 
sovereign prince from Württemberg believed that all the Protestant princes should have united 
against the Catholic threat. It was he who suggested that it was the prince’s responsibility to establish 
an evangelical church (Spitz, 112, 113). 
In between was the Palatinate, coming from a region which was neither clearly more Catholic nor 
more Protestant, who allowed Protestantism to flourish without officially changing the religion of 
the area (Spitz, 112-113). While the Palatinate might have benefited from a Peace that removed 
religious issues from the agenda altogether, since it would have allowed for the practice of both 
faiths in the area without any relationship between the region and the faith, the agenda was not 
leaning this direction. Because the Protestants were greater in number at the Peace, priority was 
given to negotiating a settlement which would explicitly address religious questions. 
One reason for this prioritization of a religious peace over a territorial peace (as historians describe 
it) may have been that, prior to the Diet, the Protestant princes​17​ met at their own council at 
Naumberg to agree to a common policy. First they agreed that they would adhere to the terms of the 
CA in 1530. They made three specific demands to this end: 1) they wanted “security under Public 
Law of the Empire” for everyone who agreed with the CA, either presently or in the future; 2) 
liberty to hold any ecclesiastical property which might be secularized in the future; 3) toleration for 
Lutherans within Romanist states without corresponding toleration for Romanists in Lutheran states 
. While the Diet did not accept these terms exactly, the Protestants did manage to sideline the 
Catholics’ preference for discussing a territorial peace and obtaining aid for the Turks instead (Spitz, 
114). 
The actual provisions within the Peace were somewhat different from the Protestants’ demands. 
Not surprisingly, the Romanists would not agree to the Protestants’ third demand. Instead, the 
policy of ​cuius regio, eius religio ​was articulated at the Peace, stating that the secular territorial ruler 
could choose between the Lutheran and Romanist faiths, and that decision would be binding upon 
his subjects. Both the Romanists and the Lutherans tried to use the principle to constrain the other 
group, the Romanists demanding that any ecclesiastical prince who changed his faith would lose his 
property and dignity, while the Lutherans wanted toleration for their faith in Romanist territories .​18 
Discussion at the Peace therefore focused upon issues of religious peace. There were several 
relevant questions: could spiritual peace ensue if the princes agreed to the peace as imperial estates 
–and in so doing, they would not be breaking their oath to the papacy? Would Protestants obtain 
spiritual jurisdiction and Church property (for this was what they needed to form a territorial 
church)? Should Protestantism be acknowledged, but contained such that it could not expand 
further? The final policies agreed upon at the Peace addressed these questions by stating that the 
prince would control the actual worship of a region, but no one would be forced to participate, and 
all subjects had the right to participate (Spitz, 117). 
 
The final provisions of the Peace compromised upon the two groups’ demands. These included the 
following:​19 
1. No estate of the Empire was to compel another to change its religion, or to make war on this 
account; 
2. No ecclesiastical official could pronounce the Peace of Augsburg without losing his office; 
3. Any official who had already pronounced the Peace of Augsburg could not lose his office or 
property he had held since before 1555; 
4. Ecclesiastical jurisdiction was suspended in areas of the Augsburg Confession; 
5. No imperial estate was allowed to protect the subjects of another imperial estate; 
6. Every citizen had the right to practice either religion without losing rights, property or honor; 
7. The peace would include free knights and free cities of the Empire. 
 
Tüchle argues that the provisions within the Peace, listed above, can be understood as a set of 
questions about the rights of a multiplicity of actors to govern the Reformation (154). For example, 
kings thought that it was the possessor of supreme authority “who was competent to provide for 
church and parish,” but others thought that the right belonged to whoever “subjects owed both 
obedience and ground-rents,” even if they lacked supreme jurisdiction. These divergent views did 
result in administration by different actors despite common institutions (160-161). 
 
Sectors of Analysis in Medieval International Society 
Sectors of analysis, as I mentioned previously, identify relations in a given issue area. When Buzan 
and Little introduce the analytical device of sectors in their work, ​International Systems in World History, 
they discuss several broad issue areas which may apply to a multiplicity of international systems: 
military, political, economic, environmental and socio-cultural issue areas (Buzan and Little, 71). 
However, these are examples of sectors, in particular ones which the serve the purpose of their 
study, to consider the broadest range of international systems across time. Here, because I am 
concerned with a specific place (Europe) and a much more limited time period (late medieval 
international society), I apply the concept of sectors, keeping in mind that the specific case of 
medieval international society requires focusing on different sectors. 
What is the value of using sectors of analysis? Sectors, like levels, help identify specific processes 
which are otherwise obscured by looking at relations in a different manner. For example, if one 
discusses the “domestic” level, this may be too broad of a characterization if one is interested in the 
specific economic processes of a given domestic state. In this way, sectors are comparable to 
regimes, in that regimes consist of rules in a given issue area, such as international monetary 
relations. But unlike regimes, which focus on shared rules within a given issue area, sectors more 
broadly identify ​relations​ within issue areas. This opens up possibilities for discussing both rules and 
structures within sectors. As stated by Buzan and Little, “One way of understanding sectors … is to 
see them as views of the whole system through an analytical lens which selects one particular type of 
relationship and highlights the types of unit, interaction and structure most closely associated with 
it” (Buzan and Little, 71). 
But there is a caveat regarding sectors which is worth mentioning as well. Just as focusing on a given 
level of analysis can lead to the illusion that, for example the system level, is isolated and 
independent, so focusing on sectors can make it seem like issues are separate from one another.​20​ As 
Buzan and Little write, “the activities of social actors operating in one sector may in practice be 
playing important roles in another sector” (Buzan and Little, 76). For this reason, once sectors of 
analysis are in place, it can be helpful to think of which relations across sectors are relevant (B and L, 
75), asking questions such as: in which sectors do relations cut across other sectors? How do these 
relations which overlap between sectors give us a broader picture of the underlying ordering 
principles of the society? What do the sectors tell us about the structure of the international society? 
These are empirical questions, so I treat them as such. Thus, with the case of medieval 
international society, I begin with what Bozeman called the “three great powers” of Europe—the 
university, the papacy and the Empire—and analyze them as sectors. One advantage of analyzing 
them this way is that it allows me to consider sets of associated relationships within the most 
significant issue areas for the historical context. One may think of these sectors as capturing a 
knowledge-based issue area, a religious issue area and a political issue area.​21​ In this section, I seek to 
capture the main groups of actors and relations within each of the sectors separately. However, after 
discussing each sector separately here, I will return to the three great powers approach, given that 




Whereas, in most [historical] empires, the emperor’s position was strengthened by the fact that he was 
descended either from god or from his prophet, in Christendom he was neither one or the other (Van 
Creveld 1999, 59). 
 
Who belonged to the empire, and how did the empire claim authority in medieval 
international society? According to the conventional wisdom of the time, the Emperor was the 
“secular” head of affairs, while the pope was the religious head of affairs. Marsilius of Padua cites 
this as the conventional wisdom in the following manner: “ ‘Behold, here are two swords,’ said the 
apostles, replying to Christ. ‘And he,’ that is, Christ, ‘said to them: It is enough.’ By these words, 
according to some men’s interpretation, it must be understood that there are in the present world 
two governments, one ecclesiastic or spiritual, the other temporal or secular” (Marsilius 1956, 110). 
Marsilius’s description draws attention to two important aspects of imperial authority. First, the 
secular and the religious, the spiritual and the temporal, are two separate realms which require two 
separate authorities. Second, the two realms draw their authority from the same source: two 
equivalent swords derived from apostolic succession. 
At the same time, historical geography from the time period tells us that the Holy Roman 
Empire was a specific area within Europe, a fact which emphasizes the more limited role of the 
Empire (see maps at the end). The Peace of Augsburg, as a meeting of the Empire, was less clearly 
pan-European compared to Constance. However, it is also important to note how difficult it is to 
locate the Holy Roman Empire. Unlike modern nation-states, its specific domain was not fixed, but 
rather in Christian Europe the emperors “kept moving from one place to another” (Van Creveld, 
59). 
Adding to this, the secular and religious capitals of Christendom did not overlap, while in 
other empires, such as Byzantium, secular and spiritual authority remained located in one place 
(Constantinople). To make matters even more complicated, some regions which were under the 
authority of the papacy did not submit to the authority of the emperor (Van Creveld, 59). Unlike the 
Church “sector,” the imperial sector did not have a clear hierarchical order of different kinds of 
actors. Within the realm of imperial/secular authority, in addition to the emperor, the most 
significant actors were sovereign princes and free cities. At both the Council of Constance and the 
Peace of Augsburg, rights and authorities of princes and cities were contended with (sometimes 
recognized, other times limited). 
For example, the final agreements at the Peace of Augsburg specifically addressed the 
privileges and obligations of both cities and princes. We know this because the Peace explicitly 
stated that it would include free knights and cities (see number 7 on page 18); thus, when provisions 
within the Peace referred to the “estates” of the Empire, estates could either have a sovereign prince 
or be a free city. In this regard, the first, fourth and fifth provisions (see page 18) were particularly 
relevant. These provisions stated that no estate could force another to change its religion, that 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction was suspended in the areas of the Augsburg Confession, and that no estate 
could protect the subjects of another estate. Similarly, at Constance, the concordats with the nations 
served a similar purpose. 
On one hand, treating princes and cities both as imperial estates gives them a certain equality 
of authority, while on the other it gives them each a distinct authority which cannot be easily 
trumped. In the former scenario, princes and cities are equally recognized within the Empire and, 
while their jurisdictions are organized differently, they fulfil similar functions. However, in the latter 
case, princes and cities each have authority because they are different – they are functionally 
differentiated, in other words. In this case, the continued authority of both depends on their both 
fulfilling distinct functions. The fact that cities were already having trouble maintaining 
independence and authority even by the time of Constance (see Spruyt 1994, ch. 2) suggests that, at 
least in some cases, estates which were cities would not have been equal to those which had 
sovereign princes. 
However, despite the fact that cities and princes were recognized within the Empire, this recognition 
did not run both directions. Since the later Middle Ages, princes considered themselves “de facto, if 
not ​de jure, superiorem non recognoscentes,” ​meaning they did not recognize the secular authority of the 
emperor, but they did not necessarily reject the authority of the pope or the ​res publica christiana 
(Lesaffer 2004, 14). It was therefore common to draw upon canonists, who were writing from the 
thirteenth century onwards about how princes and kings were indeed comparable to emperors. For 
example, Johannes de Blanosco, a French canon lawyer wrote: “…A baron who rebels against the 
king … is seen to have acted directly against the Prince, for the king of France is Prince in his own 
kingdom, for he recognizes no superior in temporal affairs” (quoted in Tierney 1964, 163). 
But there is a tension here: while the argument for princes’ authority was based on the lack of any 
higher authority in temporal affairs, many of these princes recognized the authority of both the 
papacy and the ​res publica Christiana​. And within the latter in particular, the conventional wisdom was 
that the Emperor was the source of temporal authority. It therefore becomes problematic to 
subsume princes under imperial authority as well as not to. Princes, being temporal authorities 
belonged in the temporal realm—from the imperial perspective. I will reconsider this question of 
where princes fit within the structure of medieval international society when I discuss the church 
sector, since the question will have different answers depending on the sector. 
 
The University 
In medieval international society, universities were considered ​universitas, ​mirroring the Holy Roman 
Empire and the Church (Wieruszuwski 1966, 16). At both Constance and Augsburg, theologians and 
canonists both played important roles in shaping the nature of the debate. At both congresses, there 
were numerous individuals from universities, and these individuals were often charged with defining 
the terms of the discussion. This was especially explicit in the case of Augsburg, since the Peace 
applied only to those estates which had agreed to the Augsburg Confession, which was in turn 
written by theologians (mainly Luther and Melanchthon and those they were associated with). 
However, theologians and canonists were also present in significant numbers at the Council of 
Constance, some of whom were colleagues of John Hus, so they were well prepared to contend with 
his arguments. In a sense then, these canonists and theologians at both congresses constituted a kind 
of epistemic community, in that they represented communities with shared knowledge, which they 
were able to mobilize in the interest of policies. 
However, in the medieval era universities were more than just hubs which facilitated epistemic 
communities at important councils and diets. Universities were legitimate political actors because 
many students and masters actually obtained their rights because of their status as a member of the 
university. For example, at the University of Bologna, Italian students and masters were excluded 
from the nations, the main organizing entity at universities, because they already had rights as Italian 
citizens. The foreigners, on the other hand, obtained their rights through membership in their 
respective nations (Kibre 1948​,​ 8). For this reason, there were real political justifications for 
universities to be represented at both Constance and Augsburg; to exclude them would have meant 
excluding large segments of the international society’s population. Thus, it seems unlikely that 
universities were included only because they offered authoritative expertise to the Council and the 
Diet, respectively. 
Universities also had a particularly significant influence at Constance because they provided the 
model for the Council’s organization. Like universities, the Council of Constance was organized 
according to nations. And like the nations at universities, the nations at Constance were loose 
geographical groupings, not tied to territorial borders. For example, all of Southern Europe was 
considered the French nation, while the English were initially included in the German nation until 
they split off as a separate nation, when numbers shifted in the direction of the Germans (Bozeman, 
434-435). However, this is not to say that the nations at Constance and at the universities were not 
sources of identity. 
The Council of Constance specifically drew upon the University of Paris’s organizational 
system of nations. This is important to note for two reasons: 1) the University of Paris system of 
nations was distinct because it had strong associations with the dialectical tradition of thought, 
which informed its rules and structure; in particular because this tradition reinforced the hierarchical 
order of medieval international society at the university; 2) the University of Paris was by far the 
most cosmopolitan of the European universities at the time (cosmopolitan in its representation of 
European international society, not outside); this gave it a great deal of authority (Wieruszuwski 
1966, 49; Kibre1, 8). 
At the University of Paris, Peter Abelard influenced the fomentation of dialectical 
pedagogy.​22​ Sounding quite modern, he was once quoted saying: “Through doubting we come to 
inquiry, and through inquiry we perceive truth” . Abelard’s methods helped the University of Paris 
develop its strength in theology, with the liberal arts serving as its foundation. This meant that the 
liberal arts were by far the inferior discipline at the University; most students of the liberal arts 
studied them only as a precedent for theology rather than as an end in itself . 
The inferior status of the liberal arts was at least one of the reasons why the nations were 
organized at the University of Paris. While the masters of theology were more powerful, they were 
also too connected to the cathedral chapter​23​ to allow them the freedom to provide any independent 
leadership for the university. The nations were recognized officially as corporations in the 
mid-thirteenth century; juxtaposed on this success for the liberal arts, around the same time the 
study of Roman law was forbidden at the University of Paris because it could taint the study of 
theology . 
Hierarchy not only characterized the disciplines covered at the University of Paris, but also 
the structure of the nations. At Paris, the nations were associations of masters (lecturers). Students 
were members, but they had no say in the day-to-day decisionmaking. Rather, in belonging to a 
nation, they reaped the benefits of its status . Wieruszowski, in discussing the University’s Charter, 
quotes the following statement: “There is to be no student without a regular master” . Daly also 
describes a Parisian nation as a corporation of masters working within the same rules and 
procedures . 
Some scholars contrast the Paris model with the Bologna model of nations, casting them as 
archetypes of medieval organization, especially because Bologna is often placed within the 
“rhetorical” tradition, making the two universities philosophically distinct from one another . The 
differences in the organization of nations is striking; a Bologna nation was an association of students 
from the same region who banded together to protect common interests . Thus, student members 
of the nations at the University of Bologna had much more say in decisionmaking- at least officially . 
However, the nations at Bologna did have complex voting practices and rules governing the 
conduct of meetings though. For example, many of the nations forbid members to come armed to 
assemblies; the German nation had mandatory attendance, violation of which was punishable by a 
fine; and a number of nations held votes by a “black-and-white-bean” system: white was positive 
and black was negative; a collector would monitor whether everyone only voted once by counting 
the beans in the box. If the collector caught someone placing two beans in the box, they 
automatically lost their vote, and the assembly would have to start over . 
Yet, regardless of how the nations were organized, they were what gave universities political 
authority—as well as a means to enforce that authority, as the examples of mandatory attendance 
and the collection of fees from the Bologna nations demonstrate. It was with this authority as a basis 
that universities sought to have more say in broader concerns of the international society. For 
example, the universities even sought to conduct external relations in matters of peace and amity, 
though they were criticized by the papacy and governing officials (princes and cities)(Kibre 1961, 
186). Could universities have “foreign policy”? It was an ongoing question, one not easily resolved in 
a society with a plethora of different authorities. Inside the university’s domain, its authority was not 
questioned (at least by those inside). 
 
The Church 
Constance and Augsburg shared a similar objective: to reunify the Church as the ​res publica 
Christiana​, otherwise known as the ​congregatio fidelium​, or “congress of the faithful.” One can look at 
the Church as an actor in three different ways: in one sense, it was the entire community of believers 
(​congregatio fidelim);​ in another sense, it was the hierarchical administration of offices, starting from 
God, leading to the papacy, the cardinals, and finally to the rectors of individual parishes (the Curia 
Romana);​24​ finally, another version emphasizes the importance of general councils as the 
representative body of the ​congregatio fidelium. ​At Constance and Augsburg, the relative importance of 
each of these versions of the Church as an actor was debated. 
At Constance, this debate took place between conciliarists and papalists. The conciliarists 
aimed to make the ​congregatio fidelium ​precede the papacy as the supreme authority of Christendom 
(Spinka, 4; Black 1979, 1). They drew from earlier canon law, as well as from intensive study of the 
scriptures. According to Tierney, the canonists believed that ‘authority in a corporation was not 
concentrated in the head alone but diffused among the various members, that the power of 
jurisdiction, unlike the power of order, was conferred on a prelate by human delegation in the act of 
“election”’ (Black, 10, 13).​25​ Some scholars argue that representative assemblies and constitutional 
practices that were starting to be used in secular states served as a model for the conciliarists (Black, 
11); this suggests that contemporary practice, in addition to canon law and the scriptures, were 
important in constituting how the conciliarists imagined how the ​congregatio fidelium ​should look in 
practice. For example, Juan de Segovia drew a link between the idea of the guild as a commune, the 
central organizing principle of conciliarism, and civic republicanism (Black, 2,12).​ ​26 
On the other side, of course, were those who were not interested in conciliarism at all, and 
remained convinced that the ​congregatio fidelium ​was realized in the daily operation of the Curia 
Romana. On one hand, the Council of Constance’s resolution tells us that the papalists “won” with 
Martin V’s election, but on the other hand, Martin V was elected, which was an unusual situation for 
a pope. Even though official church accounts do not acknowledge Constance’s authority before 
Martin V was elected, they do acknowledge that it was an ecumenical council after his election; this 
indirectly endorses the actions of the conciliarists. 
By the Peace of Augsburg, the concerns which were expressed in terms of conciliarism and papalism 
at Constance became expressed in a new way: the reformers challenged the Church hierarchy not by 
directly arguing against papal authority and for the legitimacy of the council, but by including more 
people (in particular, laypeople) in the practices of the Church. This challenged the hierarchy 
because previously the Curia Romana had exclusive privileges to preach, minister to the public, grant 
indulgences and perform the sacraments. The resolutions at the Peace of Augsburg made it possible 
for sovereign princes and cities to determine the religion within their areas of 
jurisdiction—effectively dismantling ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The Curia Romana depended upon 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction in order to maintain its hierarchical structure. “Ecclesiastical” simply means 
having to do with the “ecclesia,” or bishops. Thus, ecclesiastical jurisdiction marked dioceses, and 
these were the areas through which the Church collected taxes. A great deal of the discussion at the 
Peace of Augsburg therefore centered upon whether the Protestants would obtain Church property, 
thus allowing them to build their own infrastructure. 
From the Church’s standpoint, losing ecclesiastical jurisdiction meant more than losing 
financial stability. As a result of the Peace of Augsburg, areas which were once dioceses were now 
the dominions of princes in religious matters. Although the princes would have argued that these 
areas had been their dominions for a long time already, before Augsburg it was not so clear what the 
prince’s relationship was to the Church hierarchy present within his dominion. Thus, for the church 
this was a great loss; it not only lost property and revenue, but it lost its influence in many localities 
in the Empire. Without control of the dioceses, and therefore cathedrals, the Church lacked a way to 
organize the life of local communities, which had long been the purpose of cathedral chapters 
(Wieruszuwski, 18-19). 
This result of Augsburg, that the Church was more removed from the regular life of 
individuals within international society, stands in direct contrast to the results of Constance. At the 
end of Constance, one of the results was the set of concordats between the nations and the papacy, 
which created relations and rules shared between specific local areas and the papacy. One can argue 
then that the Church became more involved in the day to day life of medieval international society, 
at least officially, between Constance and Augsburg. 
Still, even after Augsburg, the Church more than any other actor had responsibilities and 
rights which cut across all sectors of society. For example, at both Constance and Augsburg, the 
relationship between the papacy and the emperor was at issue. Although in both cases the emperor 
called the Council and the Diet, respectively, his role in doing so was not given. Rather, it is possible 
to argue that the emperor called both out of necessity; in the case of Constance, no one could agree 
which ​pope should call the Council in order for it to be legitimate (although John XXIII called it, 
some would not have gone had the emperor not also called it); while at Augsburg, the pope would 
not call a council, and so Charles V called the Diet in the interest of reunifying the ​res publica 
Christiana. ​Presumably the situation was dire enough. In both cases, the emperor played an important 
role that the pope, in the circumstances, could not play—and yet, in many other circumstances, only 
the pope would have the authority to call a council. 
In the next section I seek to make some sense of these cross-cutting relations in medieval 
international society. I am in particular focused on the questions: how does the concept of 
“heterarchy” help capture these cross-cutting relations? But simultaneously, in which relations do we 
see elements of hierarchy and anarchy? 
 
Ordering Principles in Medieval International Society 
In my introduction, I said that I would discuss how ordering principles help identify the nature of, 
and the limits of, the overlapping consensus which existed in medieval international society. After 
discussing the international society with the sectors of analysis approach in the last section, 
identifying the overlapping consensus is now more possible, given this consensus arises from the 
cross-cutting relations between different types of actors. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that ordering principles are an analytical device, which tell us 
something about the structure of an international society, but not its foundational principles or 
institutions. Thus, many of the practices which came up in the two historical sections of this paper 
will be useful for later discussions of principles of legitimacy associated with institutions. Thus, the 
objective of discussing ordering principles in relation to the three sectors of analysis I already 
covered is to create a sorting system for various relations within medieval international society. 
Here I include a number of ordering principles: hierarchy, anarchy, heterarchy and autarchy. In his 
work in progress, “International Political Structures,” Donnelly has argued that we need a more 
extensive typology of ordering principles to take into account both historical and contemporary 
variation away from the conventional definition of “international anarchy.”​27​ He therefore discusses 
three “sets” of ordering principles: unranked, singly ranked and multiply ranked orders. Unranked 
orders consist of those orders in which there is an absence of superordination; Donnelly suggests 
that a useful term to describe such orders is “autarchy,” which means self-rule. He further adds 
something beyond the meaning of anarchy because it is possible to have an entirely autarchic system, 
in which all actors persist in self-rule, while only some of them of are equal. “For example,” 
Donnelly writes, “individuals, firms, and non-governmental organizations are not sovereign equals in 
a system of sovereign states”(4). However, if only some actors are equals in autarchic systems, and 
therefore able to engage in self-rule, how do we classify the other actors which are not equals? Of 
course, Donnelly does not suggest that the capacity for self-rule depends on a condition of equality 
with other actors; if he had, why use a different term from anarchy? Nevertheless, I believe there is 
an unanswered question here: is self-rule possible for actors which are not in an elite group of 
equals? I will return to this question after introducing the other groups of ordering principles. 
Singly-ranked systems are those which “are encompassed within a single comprehensive ranking 
system,” those systems which are otherwise called systems of hierarchy (4). These can be divided 
into “binary” and “multi-tiered” hierarchies; binary including those which have a single leader or an 
oligopolistic concentration of authority at the top, while multi-tiered hierarchies are pyramidal, with 
many different actors with different levels of authority based on where they stand on the pyramid 
(5). And although Donnelly writes, “Units are autonomous in autarchy, embedded in hierarchy, and 
variously related in heterarchies” (6), his suggestion that there may be groups of actors in autarchic 
systems which are equals raises questions about how groups of equals relate to others. Is it possible, 
for example, to have a group of actors which relate to each other in an autarchic manner in certain 
sectors of society, but who relate to each other in various ways, including degrees of super- and 
sub-ordination? 
This, in Donnelly’s language, is heterarchy. Heterarchy is the ordering principle of multiply-ranked 
orders, which he describes in the following manner: “Authority, however, may be allocated 
differently in different substantive or spatial domains, resulting in multiple ‘hierarchies’ and 
potentially complex, even cross-cutting, systems of super- and subordination” (5). He further adds 
that while in hierarchy there is “only one top; heterarchy, on the other hand, has several tops” (6). 
While the value of having an analytical method to identify relations in complex, multi-tiered systems 
cannot be underestimated, I still think the term “heterarchy” raises more questions than it answers. 
First, if heterarchy consists of multiple hierarchies, why not discuss them as such? To subsume them 
into a system of heterarchy takes away from seeing these hierarchies in their own right. And with 
this in mind, how do we make sense of a system which in actuality (empirically) has multiple tops, 
but which argues that in fact it has only one top (the sources of legitimacy for that top)? This is a 
question which takes us back to the issues of functional universality and ontological universality. In 
the former scenario, it’s clearly heterarchy, but with several actors making universalist claims that 
they belong at the top of the hierarchy, it seems reasonable to continue discussing these hierarchies 
separately. 
This is, I believe, what was going on in late medieval international society: it was a system with 
multiple tops, yes, and to understand the cross-cutting relations between the different groups of 
actors (universes/sectors), we need heterarchy. However, to understand the relations within the 
sectors, it is important to continue discussing hierarchy, given especially how the Emperor, princes, 
the Council, and the papacy all made universalist claims at times which placed them at the top of the 
hierarchy (in theory). With the remainder of this discussion, I will use these ordering principles as a 
means of understanding these cross-cutting relations. To do so, I begin with a visual representation 
of Donnelly’s ordering principles (see next page): 
Quadrant 1, Autarchy: ​Here all actors are on the same level, though note how some may be in an 
enclosed group of equals. These are functionally similar actors, who share the same kinds of 
practices among each other, although their status as a group does not guarantee them any greater or 
better rights and responsibilities than others in the system. This may be a useful way to think about 
the sovereign princes in medieval international society (as the group of equals), while all others 
(universities, cities, etc.) in the Empire would be able to rule autonomously, while being functionally 
different. On the other hand, this category of a group of equals could be useful when looking from 
the specific perspective of any one type of actor; for example, if one placed all the universities into 
the “group of equals” category, they would have specific ways of relating to one another that would 
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 Quadrant 2, Singly-ranked hierarchy: ​This is a system in which there is an elite group or leader, and 
all others are beneath that group. Think Plato’s guardian class here. This system certainly captures 
the ​idea ​of hierarchy within medieval international society, and for this reason it is useful. For 
example, from the perspective of the papacy or the Council at Constance, each one might be 
considered the “elite class” under which all were subordinate. 
 
Quadrant 3, Multiply-ranked hierarchy: ​Here there are different levels of authority, but they all flow 
from the same source at the top, and each level has a clear relationship of super- and sub-ordination 
in relation to the other levels it is near (with the exception of the level just below the top. The first 
three levels of the church hierarchy in medieval international society could be thought of this way 
(papacy, cardinals, bishops). 
 
Quadrant 4, Heterarchy: ​While singly-ranked hierarchy and multiply-ranked hierarchy may be 
represented visually more easily, there are infinite ways to capture heterarchy, since the ways in 
which cross-cutting relations between different levels of analysis might occur are empirical 
questions. Nonetheless, I provide an example of how heterarchy encompasses multiple levels of 
analysis and different actors on each level, with varying degrees of authority. 
What is interesting is that a visual representation reveals how heterarchy actually encompasses 
elements of both autarchy and hierarchy. In heterarchy, there are actors on the same level of analysis 
who share a kind of “equality,” and these groups may then be superordinate to, as well as 
subordinate to, other actors. Below is a representation of just the Church’s organizing structure in 







Metropolitans (Archbishops) Minor patriarchs (titular archbishops; after 1453) 
| 
Exempt bishops​​+​​ ---- Bishops -- Titular Bishops 
/ | 
/ \ 
Praelati nullius Praelati nullius Superiors of exempt religious colleges° 












+​They were directly accountable to the papacy. 
*They had quasi-authority over a diocese. 
§They had episcopal authority over a territory not belonging to any diocese. 
°They had authority over the personnel of their own communities. 
^Rectors were appointed in non-canonical parishes. 
 
In future research, I will use these ordering principles as a starting point for getting at the 
institutions present within the international society at the time. The relevance of multiple hierarchies 
and the role of autarchy will suggest the types of rules and institutional arrangements required for 
the society. I aim to use the ordering principles under discussion to answer questions such as, 
between the Council of Constance and the Peace of Augsburg, did medieval international society 
transform from a society more interested in maintaining hierarchy to one that was willing to accept 
heterarchy as the practical state of affairs? Answering such questions will require considering both 
ordering principles, as well as the underlying principles of legitimacy to those ordering principles, 
which were not the subject of discussion here. Nonetheless, some speculative questions arise from 
this discussion: for example, if hierarchy was an idea as well as an ordering principle, how did it set 
limits on the institutional arrangements of the society? How also did it suggest new possibilities for 
institutional arrangements between Constance and Augsburg? 
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1​ For example, Cerny discusses “new security threats” as a result of complex, overlapping 
authorities within globalization as “neomedievalism” (1998). Not dissimilarly, Anthony Payne writes, 
“…the ‘new medievalist’ analogy is above all a metaphor and, as such, it is useful enough. However, 
viewed as prospective political analysis, it remains no more than a hypothesis and, even as that, it 
needs considerable fleshing out. … Its great merit, though, is that it does recognize that there is a 
pressing need to analyse how the globalizing economy affects political structures and the political 
behaviour that goes on within them” (2000). 
2​ See, for example, Linklater (1996) and Grovogui (2002). 
3​ For now, I use this distinction between ontological and functional universality because it serves 
the limited purpose of this paper. Given that I am only concerned with actors and ordering 
principles of international society here, it doesn’t really matter what the nature of “ontological 
universality” is. What matters is the overlapping consensus. Thus, ontological universality may 
simply stand in the background, even if it is not really “objective.” 
4​ Which, notably, was not objective, though it was given. 
5​ Though it should be noted that in medieval international society it is „anarchy amidst hierarchy“ 
rather than „hierarchy amidst anarchy.“ 
6​ Entry on “Schism” in ​The Catholic Encyclopedia, ​pp. 535-538. 
7​ According to the Catholic Encyclopedia, the French king was instrumental to this decision. This 
will be important later- perhaps part of the French uniqueness/difference argument 
8​ There were 500 representatives in the Council, consisting of 84 bishops, 220 proxies of absentee 
bishops, 100 representatives of 13 universities, 300 doctors of theology or canon law and 17 princes 
sent ambassadors. 
9 To be entirely accurate, they elected Gregory XII (number?), but he died within the year. John                                 
XXIII was his successor. And note that it ​was ​John XXIII; there have been, historically, two John                                 
XXIII, since this one is often viewed as illegitimate. Hence, John XXIII in the 1960s as well. (Just as                                     
the Catholic Church, even now, refuses to recognise Pisa as a legitimate Council). 
10​ Because the council was 45 sessions long, the exact numbers of different types of secular 
representatives was not consistent for the entire duration of the council. The council also had 
numerous visitors in attendance, whose numbers also varied. 
11​ Also, Schroeder states that there were three special “concordats,” whose terms were considered 
legitimate for five years (the French, the Spanish and the Italians). However, the concordat with the 
English nation was permanent. Jedin adds that these concordats were included approval by the pope 
of episcopal and abbatial elections, restrictions on the reservation of benefices, limitations on the 
concessions of indulgences, and payment of annates (fees payable to the Curia for the procurement 
of offices). 
12​ For example, the concordats included approval by the pope of episcopal and abbatial elections, restrictions of 
reservation of benefices, the concession of indulgences, and payment of annates (fees payable to the Curia for the 
procurement of offices). 
13​ This is a position which I believe can be supported because there were precedents which 
demonstrate how the Church criticized scholars not just for their positions, but for their means of 
argument. For example, Peter Abelard, who was one of the philosophical realists whose thinking 
influence Hus, was harshly criticized for trying to explain the Trinity and the Eucharist in rational 
terms. 
14​ See, for example, Spitz, 1956; Daniels, 1980; Thompson, 1954. 
15​ Luther was not present at the CA; it was determined that it would not be safe for him to appear 
before the Papists. Instead, Melancanthon, one of his followers completed most of the writing and 
revising of his confessions at preliminary meetings before the Confession began. Melancanthon’s 
role opens up a number of questions about authorship of the confessional articles: how much was in 
Luther’s own voice? Did Melancanthon have sufficient authority to act on Luther’s behalf? 
16​ The Marburg Articles were incorporated into ?, but all the articles which specifically referred to 
the Zwinglians were removed. [cite] However, one author refers to a Swiss addendum to the 
Marburg Articles [?]. This may suggest that the Swiss took some authority into their own hands to 
address the differences between the old and new religions in their own area. 
17​ The princes present included the Electors of Brandenburg, Saxony and the Landgrave of Hesse. 
See Spitz (cited at end of paragraph). 
18​ Allegedly, Ferdinand promised that toleration of Lutherans within Romanist territories would be 
carried out “in practice.” The fact that this promised was not followed through with became one of 
the points of contention during the Thirty Years War. 
19​ Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 12, p. 705, “Reformation” 
20​ It may be that the term “sectors” is too modern for this discussion. Another, perhaps more 
appropriate term is the German concept “Herrschaftsverband” which at once means “sovereignty 
association,” “polity,” “governance” and “unit of rule.” The term is used by Max Weber. 
21​ Note- Hasenclever et al, on knowledge, power and interests … 
22​ It is worth noting that Hus belonged to Abelard’s pedagogical tradition. 
23​ The University of Paris was originally attached to a cathedral school. In the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries, monastic schools were becoming cloistered from the public, relegating learning and 
scholasticism to only a privileged few. Cathedral schools became more popular because they gave 
the middle classes a venue for academic pursuits. Further, cathedrals and their respective schools 
brought the Church to the public, so that the Church hierarchy became relevant in even the most 
remote localities. For example, in contrast to parish churches, with only one priest, cathedrals would 
have a group of clergymen from several ranks of the Church hierarchy (Wier.., 18-19). 
24​ Note that this version of the Church as an actor does not include laypeople, since it is based on 
the idea of Apostolic Secession, with those ordained being the „keepers of the keys“ (cite). 
25​ However, this argument only presents one type of conciliarism, electoral conciliarism, whose 
proponents believed that the Council represented the Church because it is elected. There were also 
episcopal conciliarists, who believed that the Council represented the Church because it is 
comprised of bishops; collectivist conciliarists, who believed that Council was a microcosm of the 
whole Church as a unified, organic entity; moderate conciliarists, who believed that the Council was 
an occasional legislative body and ‘emergency superior’ to the pope; and radical conciliarists, who 
believed that the Council ought to be the normal, juridical sovereign of the Church. 
26​ ​ ​ Black argues that Marsiglio of Padua also made links between civic republicanism and 
conciliarism, although he approached it from the opposite direction from Segovia. While Segovia 
related conciliarism to civic republicanism, Marsiglio extended civic republicanism to the religious 
sphere. In ​Defender of the Peace ​(1324), he argued that just as the citizenry were sovereign in political 
matters, so were the members of the religious community sovereign in religious matters. This is 
because both can be conceived as a ‘corporation of” citizens/faithful (​universitas civium/ universitas 
fidelium)​. 
27​ Donnelly is not the only one who has argued this. Since the mid-1990s, there has been a 
proliferation of work criticizing Waltz’s anarchy-hierarchy dichotomy, e.g. Lake (1996). However, 
Donnelly’s work is the only one I have seen which actually seeks to come up with a new typology of 
sets of ordering principles, rather than just suggesting IR scholars do so. This is why I concentrate 
on his typology alone here. 
28​ This diagram is my own visual representation based on the Catholic Encyclopedia entry on 
„Hierarchy.“ 
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